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Cornerstones of the Judicial Process

CORNERSTONES OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Jerold H. Israel
Under our federated system of governing major modifications in specific proceA sm,all group
dures and in institutions of administration.
ment, each state and the federal government
have their own criminal justice processes.
Though the cornerstone objectives themnet
The federal system must comply with the
of
selves are well established, there has always
constitutional prerequisites set forth in the
been considerable disagreement as to the
Bill of Rights, and the state systems must
objective
precise scope of each objective and the weight
s sihiape
comply with those Bill of Rights' provisions
accorded a particular objective when balmade applicable to the states by the Fouranced against another. These disagreements
ic st
explain in large part the differences in the
teenth Amendment,' but those constitutional
prerequisites allow considerable room for
content of each jurisdiction's implementavariation from one jurisdiction to another. In
tion of the criminal justice process. The
many respects, the fifty states and the federal
disagreements also are reflected in the frel ega li4
government have used that leeway to proquent divisions within the United States Suduce considerable diversity in their respecpreme Court as to the interpretation of the
tive criminal justice processes. At the same
constitutional limitations shaped by the objectives. This article does not reach those
i
time, however, one can readily identify certain common notions that run through the
disagreements, but concentrates on the prefifty-one American criminaljustice processes.
requisites for their analysis -- identifying the
Those notions are the subject of this article.
general character of the criminal justice corA small group of "cornerstone" objec-Jfeden
Ilk,
nerstones, and identifying the major elements
tives shape both the basic structure and the
of the process that reflect their general influgoverning legal principles of the process in
ence.
each state and in the federal system. Various
elements of these cornerstone objectives are mandated by the
Implementing the Enforcement of the Substantive Law
federal constitution, but their widespread acceptance was not a
Roscoe Pound noted long ago that "legal procedure is a
product of the Constitution. The state processes were not subject
means, not an end; it must be made subsidiary to the substantive
to federal constitutional prerequisites until the adoption of the
law as a means of making that law effective in action."2 While
Fourteenth Amendment after the civil war, but the objectives
a procedure may promote values independent of the aims of
were established long before then. Indeed, most of the cornersubstantive law, Pound was correct in characterizing the raison
stone objectives existed in the criminal justice processes of the
d'etre of any procedural system as accomplishing the practical
original states and the initial federal system, both of which
Jerold H. Israel is the Alene and Allan Smith Professor of Law at the
borrowed largely from English common law. Two centuries
University of Michigan Law School and the Ed Roode Eminent
later, the premises underlying these objectives continue to be at
Scholar in Trial Advocacy and Procedure at the University of Florida
the core of the American criminal justice process, notwithstandCollege of Law.
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substantive criminal law through the criminal justice process. For example, although it
is conceivable that the use of torture to extract confessions could add to the effectivestantive criminal law -- that is, a process
ness and efficiency of criminal law enforcethrough which the government can detect,
ment, employment8 of torture is now univerni
apprehend, prosecute, convict, and impose
sally condemned.
punishment upon those who have violated
The following subsections discuss the
alone,
choices that have been made for the Amerilive by re
the prohibitions of substantive criminal law.
However, as illustrated by the variety of
can criminal justice process as reflected in
criminal justice systems throughout the world,
for 'OceSdural
the cornerstone objectives that shape it. There
a process may be shaped in many different
are nine such objectives: (1)achieving reliways despite the universal objective of effecsystems
able factfinding (i.e., discovery of the "truth");
tively enforcing substantive criminal law.
(2) utilizing an adversarial process of adjudiThe choices made in implementing that obcation; (3) utilizing an accusatorial system of
proof; (4) minimizing erroneous convictions;
jective are what distinguish one system from
(5) minimizing the burdens of accusation and
another.
Initially, choices must be made among
litigation; (6) providing for lay participation;
alternative procedural structures, all of which
(7) respecting the dignity of the individual;
are designed to further effective enforcement
"result
(8) maintaining the appearance of fairness;
and (9) achieving equality in administration.
of substantive criminal law. The alternatives
While the general framework provided
reflect disagreements as to the procedures
needed to achieve effective enforcement and
by these goals is well accepted, the specifics
the allocation of authority to administer those procedures.' The
of their implementation are not. In part, the divisions on impleprevailing issue in this debate is to decide which structure
mentation stem from disagreement on the precise substance of
achieves the best enforcement of substantive law when reindividual goals. They also stem from an ongoing controversy
concerning the precise relationship between the goals and effecsources allocated to that task are limited.4
A second group of choices, relating to interests independent
tive enforcement of substantive criminal law. There are two
of effective enforcement, operate to make enforcement more
major facets of this controversy.
difficult to achieve. As Robert Summers notes, "in legal
The first facet relates to achieving the aims of the criminal law
through its effective enforcement. The appropriate scope of
ordering man does not live by results alone," for procedural
goals thought to serve that end may be assessed solely by
systems also seek to serve values that stand apart from achieving
"result-efficacy." 5 These independent values commonly are
determining the content of the goal itself. There is no need to
said to aim at achieving "fairness" in the process. While this
balance the interests served by the goal against the societal
amorphous concept of "fairness" may have a somewhat different
interest in effective enforcement of the criminal law because the
connotation in different societies, its fundamental elements are
goal has been selected as a means of achieving effective enforcement. The problem is that there is disagreement as to which of the
fairly uniform in democratic societies.6 Fairness imposes both
process' foundational goals, if any, are properly viewed as a
substantive and procedural norms that restrain state power in
means of achieving effective criminal law enforcement. The
criminal law enforcement. Substantive norms recognize such
interests as human dignity and personal autonomy, while procesecond facet concerns goals that are acknowledged to serve
dural norms reflect values such as community participation, a
interests that run contrary to the societal interest in effective
prescribed procedure, regularity, integrity, and promptness in
enforcement. Conflict resolution clearly is needed in this area,
application, and equality of treatment of like cases.7
but there is disagreement as to what is called for in resolving the
conflict.
Because the precise content of these independent values is
derived in large part from political ideology, tradition, and
The Aims of Effective Law Enforcement
culture, restraints imposed on the criminal justice process in
service of such values will vary from one country to the next. Yet
Some commentators suggest that each of the nine objectives
general agreement exists that some "fairness" restraints are
noted above, at least as they are traditionally implemented,
detract from achieving effective enforcement of substantive law.
needed, even when they reduce the efficient enforcement of
implementation of the substantive law. As
applied to the criminal justice process, this
universal starting point mandates a process
that promotes effective enforcement of sub-
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According to these commentators, the acceptive expertness" in separating the innocent
tance of each of these goals rests upon a
The crime
and the guilty. Of course, the crime control
balancing process in which the particular
objective requires that administrative
goal outweighs the societal interest in effecprovide "adequate guarantees of
model seeks to control factfinding
tive law enforcement. 9 The validity of this
reliabil[ity]," but the perfect accuracy sought
characterization depends in large part on how
by a more formal adjudication structure is not
iieving a
the aims of effective law enforcement are
needed.'" In a process aimed at repressing
defined.
future crime, the punishment of an innocent
One definitional starting point is that the
person or the release of a guilty person can be
basic function of criminal law enforcement is
tolerated, provided there are not frequent
to repress criminal conduct, primarily through
mistakes. As for measuring the tolerable
of apprehen
a combination of deterrence and incapacitalevel of mistake, Packer described it this way:
tion. Consistent with the classical utilitarian
justification for criminal law, this argument
The stumbling-block is this: how much
states that effective enforcement rests on
reliability is compatible with efficiency?
preventing future crime, ideally by maximizdeterrenc
Granted that informal factfinding will
ing efficient use of resources. Herbert Packer,
make some mistakes that will be remedied
in his classic article on the goals of the
if backed up by adjudicative factfinding,
Sation.
criminal justice process,' 0 explored the prothe desirability of providing this backup is
cedural needs of a criminal justice system
not affirmed or negated by factual demonthat focuses solely on efficient repression of crime. Packer
strations or predictions that the increase in reliability will
compared two models of the criminal justice process, a "crime
be x percent orx plus n percent. It still remains to ask how
control model" and a "due process model." The crime control
much weight is to be given to the competing demands of
model seeks to control crime by achieving a sufficiently high rate
reliability (a high degree of probability in each case that
of apprehension and conviction through deterrence and incapacifactual guilt has been accurately determined) and effitation. The due process model, in contrast, concentrates on the
ciency (a process that deals expeditiously with the large
fairness of the procedure and on the achievement of goals such as
numbers of cases that it ingests). The Criminal Control
respect for individual dignity and equality of treatment of indiModel is more optimistic about the improbability of error
viduals.
in a significant number of cases; but it is also, though only
While the dichotomy drawn by Packer may have some shortin part therefore, more tolerant about the amount of error
comings, it clearly illustrates the distinctions between a criminal
that it will put up with. The Due Process Model insists on
justice process that focuses solely upon "crime control" and a
the prevention and elimination of mistakes to the extent
process that considers countervailing interests in procedural
possible; the Criminal Control Model accepts the prob"fairness."" As Packer noted, a process aimed solely at achievability of mistakes up to the level at which they interfere
ing crime control could readily dispense with such goals as
with the goals of repressing crime, either because too
providing for lay participation in adjudication or ensuring that
many guilty people are escaping or, more subtly, because
investigative methods are consistent with respect for individual
general awareness of the unreliability of the process leads
dignity. Indeed, Packer questioned whether such a process
to a decrease in the deterrent efficacy of the criminal law.
would even demand a formal adjudication process or insist upon
In this view, reliability and efficiency are not polar oppoa factfinding process as accurate as that usually thought to be
sites but rather complementary characteristics. The sysneeded in the American criminal justice process.
tem is reliable because it is efficient; reliability becomes
From a perspective of crime control, Packer noted, the "infora matter of independent concern only when it becomes so
mal administrative factfinding activities" of the police and prosattenuated as to impair efficiency.3
ecutor should be dominant. The system must "produce a high rate
of apprehension and conviction and must do so in a context where
Thus, as Packer recognized, if the aim of criminal law
the magnitudes being dealt with are very large and the resources
enforcement is simply to achieve crime control, then the goal of
for dealing with them are very limited." This, in turn, produces
obtaining reliable factfinding is consistent with, and need not be
a need for "speed and finality," which is best satisfied by relying
balanced against, the implementation of substantive criminal
primarily upon the police and prosecutor and their "administralaw. As Packer also points out, however, this perspective of the
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truth are inconsistent with imposingjust desserts upon the guilty.
reliability goal has distinct limits. The criminal justice process
Their acceptance, under this view of the aims of the criminal law,
can implement the goal of reliable factfinding in a manner
can be explained only as the result of a choice that gave them
inconsistent with effective crime control. This occurs if (1) the
priority over the objective of achieving effective law enforceprocess requires an additional quantum of reliability beyond that
ment.
necessary to regulate crime control and does so inefficiently
A few commentators advance a long-term instrumentalist
(e.g., through the unnecessary use of scarce resources), or (2) the
view
of the aims of criminal law that would render even the truthprocedures utilized provide the appropriate level of reliability,
deflecting goals of the criminal process consistent with the
but can be replaced by other sufficiently reliable procedures that
effective implementation of substantive criminal law.' 6 Accordexpend fewer resources (or, arguably, the same expenditure at a
ing to this view, the effective enforcement of criminal law
more rapid pace).
necessarily includes an element of moral education. 7 Criminal
Interestingly, if the purpose of substantive criminal law is
law can be an effective deterrent only if it persuades and educates
perceived to be retribution rather than crime control, then a
the public as to its underlying values, including respect for
broader range of basic process goals are consistent with the
individual dignity and autonomy. The moral force of criminal
implementation of substantive law. If the primary function of
law is undermined, however, if the enforcement process fails to
criminal law is to ensure that those who transgress the basic
recognize those same values. Like criminal law itself, the
community norms of the criminal law receive their "just descriminal justice process must reflect the basic lesson that "the
serts," and effective law enforcement is judged in reference to
ends do notjustify the means."'" To gain the public's acceptance
that end, then reliable factfinding is not only a consistent goal,
of the moral values of substantive criminal law, the process must
but a goal that has no limits. From this perspective, the process
demonstrate the legitimacy of the results of its enforcement.
fails if an innocent person is punished or a guilty person is not
Proponents believe this can be achieved only through an enforcepunished. Complete truthfinding becomes an essential element
ment process that convinces the public of its "fairness." Indeed,
of the process, and all structural choices aimed at making the
they
argue the same conclusion follows from an even narrower
process more effective in discovering the truth are consistent
that focuses solely upon the successful apprehension
perspective
with effective implementation of substantive criminal law.
conviction
of offenders. The key to this success depends
and
Thus, from a "just desserts" perspective, if an adversarial
upon
public cooperation which rests on the public's
predominantly
system of adjudication provides the most accurate means of
of the fairness of the process. 9
acceptance
determining the truth, then adversarial adjuCommentators and courts generally redication also implements, rather than dea long-range instrumentalist view of
ject
such
h
re
objec[
T
process
tracts from, the underlying
"ibu
4e
live
the
relationship
between substantive law and
tive of achieving effective law enforcement.
procedure. These critics regard cornerstone
Because substantive criminal law rests upon
objectives that impair the discovery of the
a moral evaluation of the actor's culpability
truth to be inconsistent with the achievement
and because criminal statutes often defer to
precisely
community judgments rather than
enforcement of substantive crimiof effective
ent
0
Acceptance of these competing
nal
law.
of
lay
the
participation
culpability,
define
goals
is
based
on a determination that they
onficts
persons in the adjudication of guilt or innointerest in effective ensociety's
outweigh
of
the
with
the
aims
cence is consistent
4
criminal
law. Accordingly, a
forcement
of
of
avoidprocess
goal
law.
The
substantive
lawmaker must determine what content should
ing the imposition of undue burdens on the
be given to those goals by examining the
accused is also consistent with the substanat
desserts
approach,
law
under
a
just
tive
nature of the process used to reach that deterleast insofar as it reduces the burdens immination.
posed upon the innocent accused. 5 Of
Resolving Conflicts
course, the retributive view of effective law
When a cornerstone objective is in conenforcement does not eliminate conflicts
flict with the core process function of achievbetween achieving effective enforcement
ing effective law enforcement, the question
and other goals of the American criminal
justice process. Those process goals that
arises as to how that conflict was resolved and
ocess.
the objective justified notwithstanding the
impair the process' ability to determine the
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sacrifice in effective enforcement. The answer to this question
can have an important bearing on how a lawmaker approaches a
decision to adopt or reject a procedural limitation which would
serve a cornerstone objective, but only at the expense of effective
enforcement. Two different approaches to the resolution of the
conflict have been suggested. One is a utilitarian cost-benefit
balancing approach that reduces the interests in conflict to a
common denominator and weighs the costs and benefits of a
particular limitation (empirically established where possible)
against the common denominator. The second approach gives
priority to values essential for fairness and allows for the weighing of the negative effects on enforcement only when a particular
limitation does not truly rest on the basic fairness concern
underlying a cornerstone objective.
The utilitarian cost-benefit balancing approach starts from the
premise that the same basic societal concerns underlie both
effective law enforcement and those cornerstone objectives that
operate as a counterpoint to effective enforcement. The counterpoint goals seek to preserve individual freedoms by restricting
government authority to procedures that comply with norms of
"fairness." Effective law enforcement also seeks to protect
against invasions of freedom, although the approach contemplates invasions not by the government, but by criminals. 2' Thus,
both effective law enforcement and counterpoint process goals
deal with the same common denominator: the preservation of
individual freedom. This common foundation provides a single
measure for evaluating legal standards that contribute to one
value but detract from another.2 Ultimately, the conflict is not
between two inherently contradictory concerns of "crime control" versus "individual liberty," but between two different
modes of protecting individual liberty.23
In determining whether a process limitation should be imposed upon government
under a cost-benefit approach, a lawmaker
mm
must determine what measure of individual
freedom would be gained by imposing a
limitation and balance that gain against the
measure of individual freedom that would
be lost as a result of the limitation's impairment of effective law enforcement. Indeed,
the lawmaker arguably can adopt a more
generalized cost-benefit analysis, as sug-

Some co

priority to the rights of potential victims. I am prepared to
weaken the guarantees and privileges to which I am
entitled as a potential criminal, or as a defendant, in order
to strengthen my rights and safeguards as a potential
victim. Purely on the basis of probabilities, I am convinced that I run a greater danger of suffering disaster as
a potential victim than as a potential criminal or defendant.
It is these probabilities that shift from one historical period
to another that must be the guide of wise, prudent, and just
administration of law.24
Application of a cost-benefit analysis requires a series of
empirical judgments that are likely to be the subject of considerable disagreement. Initially, one must evaluate the threat to
individual liberty posed by crime. Because crime has always
been considered a serious problem in this country, the focus in
this evaluation is on the increasing severity of the threat to our
collective security. This threat is reflected in increasing rates of
victimization and decreasing clearance rates, particularly as to
violent crimes.2" If the evaluation shows a significant increase in
the threat of crime, it must then be determined whether more
effective law enforcement will significantly reduce the severity
of that threat.
Some commentators maintain that crime is primarily a product of social ills and that the only means of reducing crime is to
attack these root social causes.26 They contend that more
effective law enforcement will have only a minor impact upon
the rate or nature of crime.27 Others argue that more effective law
enforcement can significantly reduce (or at least slow the growth
of) general or particular types of criminal activity.28 If one
concludes that more effective enforcement significantly reduces
crime, the question then becomes whether
change in the process itself can contribute
substantially to increased effectiveness or
whether the key to effectiveness is the quan-

lentators

maintain tha:t crime is

primarilyap roduct Of
social ills'an d that the

gested by the philosopher Sydney Hook in
discussing the rising crime rate of the 1970s:
I submit that at the present juncture of
events, because our American cities have
become more dangerous to life and limb
than the darkest jungle, we must give

only

'so

crime is to
oat tack these
root sol -ial causes.

tity and quality of the29resources devoted to
the enforcement task.

Assuming that process changes can have
considerable impact, conflict may arise in
assessing the influence of a particular procedural change in achieving more effective
enforcement. This, in turn, leads to what is
probably the most difficult inquiry in this
analysis: judging the impact upon individual liberty when altering the restrictions
imposed upon government. With this preliminary analysis completed, the lawmaker
then turns to the final task of balancing the
costs and benefits of the particular change as
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of a particular governmental practice to
it bears upon individual liberty.
ost under ship
the underlying concern of that objective. If
Although the application of a cost-bena practice is deemed to violate a safeguardefit analysis is filled with uncertainties, its
proponents argue that the inquiry is worth
a totalita i
ing objective, then it should not be allowed
as part of the criminal justice process, rethe effort. Though the lawmaker is likely to
n Sisu4se of the
find few choices that are incontrovertible,
gardless of its positive impact upon the effective enforcement of substantive law.
the inquiry should produce distinctions in
Conversely, if a practice does not undercut a
degree and identify those balances that are
criminaljt,stilce process safeguarding objective, then balancing is
more readily drawn than others. Proponents
appropriate to maximize efficiency (i.e., in
also reject the contention that the "politics of
crime" will inevitably convert the cost-bendetermining whether resources expended
efit analysis into a tool to reduce restrictions
through the practice are justified by its enupon police and prosecutors.30 Indeed, they
forcement results).
ment
Of course, the sticking point under this
suggest that the inquiry required for such an
analysis may well serve to fortify basic libanalysis is the determination of whether a
particular practice runs counter to a safeion
perpet
erties against political pressures. As Alfred
guarding objective, thereby placing it beConard stated: "Every human value is bought
at the price of some other human value, and
such
yond the realm of utilitarian balancing. The
imes.
first step is to identify general principles of
we are destined to squander our patrimony
of liberties, like spendthrift heirs, unless we
fairness, derived from historical traditions
and widely shared values of a democratic society, that underlie
find out what we are giving for what we are getting."3
those cornerstone objectives which are designed to safeguard
An alternative approach to justifying cornerstone objectives
that detract from enforcement efficiency largely rejects balancagainst government abuse. The second step is to assess the
particular procedure in light of those principles. Proponents
ing. This approach sees the loss of liberty through criminal
argue that while there is room for disagreement among reasonvictimization or through governmental action as different in
able persons, particularly as to the second inquiry, such definicharacter and significance. As a result, these interests cannot be
weighed appropriately against one another.32 Proponents of this
tional ambiguity is less dangerous than a general application of
view argue that a choice in values must be made and, for several
utilitarian balancing. The symbolic placement of safeguards
reasons, protection against misuse of governmental authority
against governmental abuse beyond the realm of balancing
must be given the higher priority. They note that "[t]he basic
ensures, as Justice Brandeis agreed, that "fundamentals" must
prevail "no matter the ends."37
political problem of a free society is the problem of controlling
33
As an illustration of this approach, consider the question of
the public monopoly of force."
All liberty is lost under a
whether police may follow a practice of using undercover agents
totalitarian regime and the misuse of the criminal justice process
to befriend and then exploit suspects to obtain damaging admishas been a basic tool in the establishment and perpetuation of
sions. Some decisionmakers might conclude that such deception
such regimes.34 Accordingly, the paramount goal of the criminal
by the government poses an unacceptable threat to liberty bejustice process is to serve as a bulwark against governmental
cause of its chilling effect on the individual's right of association.
oppression.3" The government cannot be allowed to subvert the
For others, the government's use of such deception is acceptable
dignity of individual criminals even though the criminal may
because it poses no greater threat than similar deceptions inherharm his victim's dignity. Failure in this regard will carryover
to other aspects of governmental regulation and threaten the
ent in all personal relationships. A "friend" who turns out to be
democratic fiber of government. As Justice Holmes noted, the
a government agent is no worse than any other supposed "friend"
criminal justice process must be guided by the principle that "it
who turns out to be disloyal. A third position, falling somewhere
in the middle, suggests that governmental "planting" of a friend
is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble role."36
compares to a search for criminal evidence. Such government
actions, therefore, should be accepted only on conditions tradiWith priority automatically given to guarding against governtionally applied to searches (i.e., upon the basis of probable cause
mental abuse of the criminal justice process, adherents to the
and, possibly, the approval of a magistrate).
above position argue that the critical determination for the
The key from the perspective of opponents of general utilitarlawmaker lies not in balancing a safeguarding cornerstone objecian balancing is that each of these positions is based upon an
tive against effective enforcement, but in assessing the relation-
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analysis of the threat posed by the practice to
the individual's dignity. Unlike general
utilitarian balancing, the inquiry is not based
on the weighing of such factors as the seriousness of the threat of crime in general or of
a particular crime being investigated, the
effectiveness of governmental deception in
solving crimes, the comparative effectiveness of alternative modes of investigation
that are less threatening to individual privacy, or the capacity of the community to
exercise control over the police through
means other than legal regulation of this
practice. Admittedly, for some lawmakers,
these considerations may slide in at the edges
in assessing the character of the practice as
it relates to general principles of fairness, but
the critical distinction is that they do not
become controlling elements in determining
what governmental practices are acceptable.38

When onefocuses on

innocent is made as reliably as possible. 48 It
is in this regard that truthfinding becomes a
basic goal of the process. Focusing prima-

fair treatmetFit of the

rily on historical fact, it seeks to create a

accused, dist covery of

in the enforcement of criminal law.4 9
Various elements of the criminal justice

the truth rennains an

process specifically promote such discovery
of the truth. Initially, the process tries to
provide an investigatory capacity to uncover

importantt goal

both the commission of crime and the iden-

insofar as it serves to
protect the i nnocent
defendant 7gainst
false convJiction.

THE NINE CORNERSTONES
Discovery of the Truth
Depending upon how one views the goal of substantive
criminal law, discovery of the truth can be characterized as either
indispensable to the enforcement of the substantive law or as
largely necessary to achieving that end.39 When one focuses on
fair treatment of the accused, discovery of the truth remains an
important goal insofar as it serves to protect the innocent defendant against false conviction. Accordingly, it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court has described the discovery of the truth
as a "fundamental goal" of the criminal justice system4' and the
"central purpose of a criminal trial."42 Lower courts and commentators regularly echo such characterizations. 3
Several commentators, however, question the truthseeking
goal on epistemological grounds.4 4 They note that while
truthfinding is commonly described as aimed at serving "the dual
aim of our criminal justice system ... that guilt shall not escape

or innocence suffer,' 45 the determination of guilt or innocence
relies on more than the discovery of the truth of historically
objective facts. It also involves application of "normative judgments" measured by such mens rea elements as recklessness and
negligence and by assessing such justifications as self-defense
and duress.46 Some argue that even as to historical fact, the search
for truth is fruitless because "the truth concerning any given prior
event is unknowable" and the findings of fact are in reality
"educated guesses. ' 47 These objections, however, do not preclude a goal of ensuring that the determination as to guilt or

factfinding process that can minimize errors

tity of the offender. It seeks to provide
police and prosecutors with the authority to
identify potential sources of information and
to obtain evidence even when the sources are
not cooperative. The police, therefore, are
allowed, subject to certain limitations, to
question possible witnesses and suspects, to
search persons and property, to require suspects to participate in identification procedures, and to utilize informers and under-

cover agents. Prosecutors are granted investigative authority that is even broader in
some respects than that of police through the use of the investigative grand jury.
Discovery of the truth also requires an adjudication process
that is reliable both in the convicting the guilty defendant and
exonerating the defendant who is erroneously accused. Trial
aspects aimed at ensuring the reliability of the adjudication
process include the trial's adversary structure, prohibitions
against certain deceptive adversarial actions, evidentiary rules
promoting the production of reliable evidence, legal standards
designed to eliminate biased jurors and judges, and restrictions
limiting the scope of issues in a single trial to prevent confusing
the factfinder. Various pretrial procedures, such as discovery of
the opponent's evidence, bolster the capacity of the trial to
produce a reliable verdict.5 0 Legal restrictions upon adjudication through a guilty plea also serve to ensure the reliability of
convictions produced by that process.
Despite its importance, the truthfinding objective of the
criminal justice process is, in certain respects, sacrificed for the
benefit of other values. As one court put it: "[T]ruth, like all
other good things, may be loved unwisely -- may be pursued too
keenly -- may cost too much."'" Consequently, there comes a
point at which factfinding precision must give way to other
values that are truth deflecting. As discussed earlier, there is
considerable disagreement as to how truth-deflecting values
should be weighed against truthfinding. All agree, however, that
the commitment to other values will sometimes prevail.

U
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Most of the values prevailing over the truthfinding function
relate to substantive norms of "fairness," such as the preservation of human dignity and personal autonomy. Some values give
rise to legal norms that operate to prevent the discovery of
reliable, relevant evidence. For example, the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the state from compelling a defendant to give selfincriminating testimony and the Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures by the state and prohibits the use
of illegally obtained evidence.5 1 Other fairness standards bar
criminal convictions despite ample evidence of guilt that was
properly obtained. For example, the Fifth Amendment's double
jeopardy prohibition and Sixth Amendment's speedy trial requirement may bar convictions even though a retrial or delay
5
casts no doubt upon the accuracy of the conviction. 1
Although truth-deflecting values commonly operate to benefit the defendant, that is not always the case. Respect for such
values also may operate to keep the defendant from obtaining
exculpatory testimony or evidence. This usually arises where a
witness is excused from testifying because of the exercise of a
privilege.
Another factor sometimes balanced against the truthseeking
function is the limitation of available administrative resources. In mostjurisdictions, the
criminal justice process is burdened with
heavy caseloads.

These pressures are re-

duced by broad discretion of law enforcement agencies to allocate their efforts according to the significance of the offense
and the likelihood of a successful investiga-

tion and prosecution. The end result, however, is that at least some guilty parties may
escape detection. Limited resources also
may preclude a full investigation, by both
prosecution and defense, in cases that are
prosecuted. Neither side may have the resources to explore problematic avenues that
could conceivably produce relevant evidence.
Some commentators suggest that even
basic truthfinding safeguards in the adjudication processes are weakened by caseload
pressures. These pressures play a significant
role in shaping the law governing subjectsefen
such as plea bargaining, the joint trial of
offenders, and the provision of appointed
counsel in misdemeanor cases. Arguably,
the law does not do all it could to ensure the
reliability of adjudications. 54

Adversary Adjudication
The American criminal justice process is structured to provide adversarial proceedings for adjudicating guilt. Although
courts sometimes attribute characteristics of an accusatorial
system to the concept of adversarial adjudication,55 the key to an
adversary system is the division of responsibilities between the
decisionmaker and the parties.
An adversarial system vests decisionmaking authority, both
as to law and fact, in a neutral decisionmaker rendering a decision
in light of the materials presented by the parties. In an adversarial
criminal proceeding, there often will be two such neutral
decisionmakers, the jury (as to factual issues) and the judge (as
to legal issues). The decisionmaker in a pure adversary system
operates as "a generally silent referee, determining the case as it
is presented, and leaving it very much to the parties to choose the
battleground."56 The adversarial parties are the state and the
defendant. The adversarial model gives to the parties the
responsibility of investigating the facts, interviewing possible
witnesses, consulting possible experts, and determining what
will or will not be told. Each party is expected to present the facts
and interpret the law in the light most favorable to its side and,
through counter-argument and cross-examination, to challenge the soundness of the
presentations made by the other side. The
judge and jury then impartially adjudicate
the issues raised by the parties.
The American criminal justice process
actually seeks a "modified" or "regulated"
adversary system as opposed to the "pure"
adversary model described above. It does
not provide for a totally silent or inactive
l
judge; it imposes limits upon counsel designed to prohibit "excesses" in adversary
presentations; and it imposes a duty on one
!ways
party to assist the other in gathering inforfo
mation under certain circumstances. 7 Even
esp
with these controls, the American criminal
justice process remains sufficiently
adversarial in its overall character and stands
'es
in sharp contrast to the "inquisitorial" or
"nonadversary" systems prevailing in contiSeep
nental Europe. Under European systems,
Sfroim
the responsibility for the initial development
Ian
of relevant facts lies with ajudicial officer or
a prosecutor who collects all relevant evi-
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in a comprehensive dossier and brings
charges against the suspect if that evidence
establishes a likelihood of guilt." Once the
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accusation is filed, the trial court assumes responsibility for the
continued development of the case and the presentation of
evidence, including a predominant role in questioning witnesses. 9 Although the prosecutor and defense counsel have an
opportunity to contribute, their role is far more limited than the
60
role of counsel in the American trial.
The American adversarial system is adopted from the English
common law. Why the English developed an adversarial, rather
than an inquisitorial, system of adjudication remains a matter of
considerable speculation. Some commentators suggest that the
adversarial system is an outgrowth of theological concepts,
reflected previously in the practices of compurgation and trial by
battle. 6 Others view it as a logical extension of different aspects
of English criminal procedure, such as trial by jury and the
practice of private prosecution.61 Still others see the influence of
the same concerns for individualism and competitiveness that
63
prevailed in the establishment of the free enterprise system.
Today, only the latter thesis plays a significant role in the
common understanding of the grounding for the adversarial
character of the American criminal justice process. Adversarial
adjudication is supported on two grounds: (1) as the system of
adjudication most likely to produce accurate verdicts, and (2) as
a system that respects individual autonomy and reflects the
proper relationship between the individual and the state.'
The Truthfinding Justification
The superiority of the adversarial process
in producing accurate verdicts rests on two
premises. First, it is argued that self-interested adversaries will uncover and present
more useful information to the decisionmaker
than would be developed by the judicial
officer in an inquisitorial system. The selfinterests of the parties will ensure that all
relevant evidence is produced. As each side
challenges the soundness of the opposing
party's case, the strengths and weaknesses
of the evidence are fully explored.65 Second,
it is argued that the adversarial system precludes biased decisionmakers who are more
likely to exist in inquisitorial proceedings.
Because decisionmakers in the adversarial
system are not themselves involved in the
development of the facts, they are more
likely to approach the evidence at trial in a
disinterested fashion and withhold judgment
until the case is fully explored. 66 It is said
that an adversarial presentation is the "only
effective means for combatting [the] natural

human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that
67
which is not fully known.
While both of the above premises are subject to challenge,
critics of the adversarial system focus primarily on the first
premise, that partisan advocacy on both sides will enhance the
discovery of all relevant information. Critics contend that
adversaries have incentive to suppress and distort evidence,
utilize surprise to ambush their opponents, and cajole and intimidate witnesses. 68 Thus, the critics conclude that adversaries' selfinterests lead to the suppression of relevant information and
attempts to deceive the decisionmaker.
Most critics acknowledge that the adversarial system, coupled
with appropriate regulation to curb such excesses, might well
deliver on the claim that it provides the "best means of ascertaining truth."69 Critics contend, however, that the American crimi70
nal justice process falls far short of providing that regulation.
The American process is said to permit regular use of "devices
of adversarial litigation... [that] are not geared for, but are often
aptly suited to defeat the development of the truth."'7 Further,
critics argue that the adversarial ethos, particularly defense
counsel's overriding obligation to his or her client, naturally
fosters an incentive "to win at all costs. ' 72 To combat this
inclination and make truth "paramount" requires substantially
more than the limited and loosely formulated restraints currently
imposed upon deception and obfuscation.
Critics of the traditional adversarial system offer a variety of
proposals to place greater emphasis upon its
truthseeking function. In large part, however, these proposals have met with considAn adversarial
erable resistance. While there is widespread
support for the proposition that the
presentation, it is said, prosecution's responsibility in an adversarial
system is to "do justice" rather than "gain

is the "only effective
means for combatting
[the] natural human
tendency to judge too
swiftly in terms of the
familiar that which is
not fully known."

victory,"73 considerable disagreement exists

as to the types of restraints to place on
prosecutors to ensure adherence to that responsibility.7 4 There is similar disagreement over limits to place on defense counsel
in advancing the client's cause.75 Some
argue that restraints designed to preclude
misleading the decisionmaker undermine
the truthseeking function of the adversarial
system in the long run because they chill
76
client willingness to confide in the attorney
Further, disagreements exist as to whether
certain obligations imposed upon both sides
(e.g., providing pretrial discovery to the
opponent) detract from or add to the effectiveness of the adversarial system's truth-

U
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seeking function. Finally, rules of the
adversarial system that, to some, seem to
encourage adversary excesses are seen by
others as serving independent values of the
criminal justice process that override the
search for the truth. 77

A second criticism of the truthfinding
capacity of the adversarial system focuses
on the premise that each side will have the
equal capacity to challenge the other. Critics
argue that there is a serious imbalance in the
resources available to each side.78 They
note, in particular, that the "[s]tate has in the
police an agency for the discovery of evi-

dence superior to anything which even the
wealthiest defendant could employ." 79 These

critics see many of the accused's truthdeflecting constitutional rights as a method
of redressing this resource imbalance by
giving added protection to the "weaker
party." 80 They argue further that the expansive interpretation of these rights is essential
to serving this purpose. The need to com-

pensate for the defense's comparative weakness is also cited as justification for other
procedural obligations imposed upon the
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erroneous acquittal that stems from an
effort to protect the innocent or from an
effort to protect human dignity, but when
these concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal should be a source of
85

substantial dismay, not indifference.

According to this line of analysis, the defense may be given special protection, based
on the cornerstone values of the process,
such as the furthering of the accurate
truthfinding and protecting the dignity of
individual. An imbalance in resources
is not, however, a concern as such; the
function of the adversarial system is considered to be served adequately if the defense has sufficient resources to success-

fully challenge an erroneous prosecution.
Other Justifications
Although courts tend to stress the

truthfinding justification for the adversarial
system, commentators often stress other
values of adversarial adjudication.86 Indeed, some argue that the adversarial systion.
tem is "misdescribed as a search for the
truth," and that alternative justifications
offer the only true support for the use of adversarial rather than
inquisitorial adjudication.87
One such alternative justification values the adversarial system for its views of the defendant as an individual. Consistent
with the premise that the individual is the source of the
government's sovereignty, the adversarial system treats the
defendant as an equal to the prosecution. As Thurmond Arnold
noted:

than inqui,sitorial

adju fica

prosecution, such as pleading requirements
that narrowly frame the state's case, 8' and a prosecutorial duty
to assist the defense in gaining access to key information.82
Many such claims for "compensatory" procedural restrictions
are challenged as ignoring the underlying truthseeking function
of the adversarial system and promoting, instead, what Roscoe
Pound described as the "sporting theory" of adversarial adjudication. This theory characterizes adversarial adjudication as a
sporting battle between two contestants, each given an equal
chance of winning as they take the field, with victory awarded to
the side that displays superior skills.83 As Pound and others have
argued, that is not the objective of the adversarial trial and should
not be the perspective from which the criminal justice process is
evaluated.84 Succinctly summarizing this objection, Joseph
Grano stated:
The belief that prosecution should be made difficult for its
own sake can be premised only on the view that a criminal
trial is analogous to a. . . boxing match, in which we are
indifferent about the outcome. ... Such indifference is

inappropriate in the administration of criminal justice: if
a defendant is guilty, he should be convicted; if he is
innocent, he should be acquitted. We may tolerate an

When a great government treats the lowliest of criminals
as an equal antagonist, strips itself of the executive power
which it possesses, and submits the case to twelve ordinary
men, allowing the judge only the authority of an umpire,
we have a gesture of recognition to the dignity of the
individual which has an extraordinary dramatic appeal.88
The adversarial system also respects individual autonomy in its
commitment to the individual's control over the "basic mode of
his participation in the adjudicatory process."89 The defendant
may play an active role in his own defense. Indeed, he may
decide to forego his defense and plead guilty. As noted by the
Supreme Court, the adversarial system recognizes the "inesti-
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mable worth of free choices." 90 This, in turn,
increases the defendant's level of confidence
in the process and acceptance of even adverse results.'
The adversarial system also is justified as

The hear2' re ,lianceon

hearings, and in probation revocation proceedings. 99

Although the adversarial system has been
extended to other stages in the criminal
justice process, the trial clearly remains the
the system best suited to vindicate the rights
particulad
centerpiece for adversarial adjudication.
granted to the defendant in the interest of
Thus, it is not surprising that commentators
procedural "fairness." This "rights theory"
speak of a "decline" in the adversarial system due to the small percentage of final
of adversarial adjudication holds that the
"adversar[ial] system is inspired by an attiadjudications produced by trials. 0° In nearly
tude of distrust of public officials and its
all jurisdictions, the vast majority of charges
gap
complementary demand for safeguards
are disposed of by dismissals on motion of
against abuse." 92 Accordingly, the
the prosecution or by guilty pleas.'
The
heavy reliance on plea bargains, in particu4
adversarial system rejects the hierarchial
model of an inquisitorial process in favor of
lar, is criticized as creating an enormous gap
Sdve
between the "ideal of the adversarial sysa coordinate model that sharply divides authority and places an adversarial check on
tem" and the "reality" of criminal justice
the decisionmaker. It provides the defensystem
practice. Whether this is the case, however,
dant with a "champion" (the defense coundepends upon how plea bargaining is consel) and, in aligning that champion solely
"reality r
ducted. Though plea bargaining may have
with the client, creates a strong incentive to
certain inherent flaws,' it is not necessarily
take full advantage of all the protections the
inconsistent with the premises of adversarial
'pr actice.
adjudication. The concept of party control
law offers to the defense.
The combined justifications for the
over the direction of the litigation necessaradversarial system resulted in its extension
ily includes the authority of the parties to
to various stages in the criminal justice process. As originally
resolve their dispute through settlement.I Of course, a settleadopted in this country, the concept of adversarial adjudication
ment will not be consistent with the adversarial system if the
applied to the criminal trial alone. Thus, the Sixth Amendment's
defendant is coerced or is denied in the negotiation process the
guarantees of assistance of counsel, confrontation of opposing
same zealous representation by counsel that would be available
witnesses, compulsory process, and notice of charges contemat trial. Whether these prerequisites are commonly met in plea
plated trial.93 Gradually, however, the reach of the adversarial
bargaining is subject to question. Where they are met, however,
system was extended. Courts and legislatures recognized that
the acceptance by both parties arguably produces a result as
effective advocacy required the creation of pretrial rights, such
consistent with the objectives of the adversarial system (includas the right to pretrial discovery of at least part of the opponent's
ing its truthfinding function) as the trial."°
case.94 The role of defense counsel in protecting the accused's
rights was also extended to pretrial proceedings in which the state
Accusatorial Burdens
seeks to obtain evidence from the accused.95 Indeed, in some
The American criminal justice process is designed to be
jurisdictions, legislatures even extended the adversarial process
accusatorial as well as adversarial. The concepts of adversarial
to the grand jury, the historical bastion of inquisitorial inquiry,
adjudication and accusatorial procedure complement each other,
by allowing target witnesses to be accompanied by counsel when
but are not virtual equivalents.' 5 An accusatorial procedure
96
testifying before the grand jury.
requires the government to bear the burden of establishing the
The adversarial system has also been carried over to pretrial
guilt of the accused, as opposed to requiring the accused to bear
screening. Most states now use the adversarial preliminary
the burden of establishing his innocence. As the Supreme Court
hearing either in addition to or as a substitute for the nonadversarial
noted, an accusatorial system requires the "government in its
screening by the grand jury.97 Hearings affecting the pretrial
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load."'0 6 The
status of the accused, such as incompetency hearings and prevenprosecution must produce sufficient evidence to convince the
tive detention hearings, also use what essentially amounts to an
trier of fact of the accused's guilt, and it must do so with
"evidence independently and freely secured," without compeladversarial process. 98 In the post-trial stages, adversarial adjudi10 7
cation is now employed in certain aspects of sentencing, in parole
ling the accused to assist in this prosecution responsibility.
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Although England's adoption of an accusatorial system probably grew out of the early English view of the criminal prosecution as a victim's private action seeking personal redress, the
modern accusatorial system is justified on grounds consistent
with the recognition of crimes as public wrongs, with prosecutions brought by the state on behalf of the community as a whole.
Foremost among these grounds is the view that criminal sanctions are so severe that extra care must be taken to ensure they are
not imposed upon innocent persons. 08 Also involved is a distrust
of governmental authority based on a recognition that public
officials may seek to invoke the criminal justice machinery to
serve their own ends, rather than to protect the public.°9 Some
argue that the accusatorial process also responds to a governmental capacity to gather and preserve evidence that far exceeds the
capacity of the defense."0
The accusatorial character of the criminal justice process is
revealed in various elements of the process, including placing
upon the government the ultimate burden of persuasion and the
burden of going forward with the introduction of evidence, the
presumption of the defendant's innocence, and the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination."' Requiring the government to make the initial presentation of

well be "known to every intelligent person that the vast majority
of accused persons are guilty,"'"I5 but the presumption of innocence prohibits the jury from relying on any such general
confidence in the police and prosecutor in reaching its decision.
Finally, the privilege against self-incrimination serves the
prong of the accusatory process that forces the government to
establish its case using its own resources."16 It prohibits the state
from easing its burden of proof simply by calling the defendant
as its witness and forcing him to make the prosecution's case or
by compelling a confession prior to trial.
As with other basic themes reflected in the criminal justice
process, the accusatorial mode of shifting burdens to the state is
subject to limitations. Thus, American jurisdictions commonly
impose upon the defense the burden of initially introducing
evidence of "defenses" that could relieve the defendant of
liability." 7 Many jurisdictions go further by placing on the
defendant the ultimate burden of persuasion as to those defenses
that do not negate elements of the crime." 8 The defendant may
also bear the burden of establishing that he is incompetent to
stand trial or that adverse evidence was obtained illegally and is
therefore inadmissible.' '9 The principle that the state establish its
case independently, without the accused's

evidence strengthens the safeguard against

wrongful conviction and ensures that the
government carries the central burden of the
litigation. It gives to the accused the right
"to remain inactive and secure, until the
prosecution has taken up its burden and
produced evidence and effected persuasion."'' If the prosecution fails in its casein-chief to establish a prima facie case for
conviction, the defense is entitled to a directed acquittal without ever producing its
own evidence. Additionally, by requiring
the state to establish the defendant's guilt,
the accusatorial system assigns to the state
the burden of bearing the "margin of error"
in factfinding." 3
The presumption of innocence, while often characterized as a mere restatement of
the allocation of the burden of persuasion,
conveys a special admonition that also
strengthens the accusatorial nature of the
process. When the jury is informed of the
presumption, it is told, in effect, "to judge an
accused's guilt or innocence solely on the
evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis
of suspicions that may arise from the fact of
his arrest, indictment, or custody."' 1"It may

assistance, is confined largely to the histori-
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cal and constitutional prohibition against the
state's use of "coercion [to] prove its charge
against an accused out of his own mouth," as
reflected in the self-incrimination privilege. 20 The accusatorial system does not
prevent the state from offering the accused
an opportunity to confess guilt or even using
certain types of deception or encouragement
to acquire confessions. Nor does it bar using

the accused's person in obtaining identification evidence or taking evidence from his
possession by search and seizure. Although
all of these investigative procedures involve,
to some extent, the assistance of the accused,
they are accepted as consistent with the basic
tenets of an accusatorial process.'
Minimizing Erroneous Convictions
Protecting the innocent from erroneous
conviction is an important goal of the criminal justice process. Indeed, many argue that
this goal is of the highest priority. 22 Where
a conflict exists between protecting the innocent and other objectives of the criminal
of the innocent
justice system, protection
23

almost always prevails.
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Although the goal of minimizing erroneous convictions is
closely tied to the truthfinding function of the process, it extends
substantially beyond that function. Reliable factfinding, as a
goal in itself, seeks to ensure the accuracy of both guilty verdicts
and acquittals.' 24 Protecting the innocent, however, places
greater priority on the accuracy of the guilty verdict. It seeks to
minimize the risk of convicting an innocent person even if it
increases the chance that a guilty person may escape conviction.' 25 Accordingly, while the Supreme Court stated that "the
basic purpose of the trial is the determination of the truth,"'' 2 6 it
also noted that impairment of the trial's "truthfinding function"
is of primary concern where "serious questions [are raised] about
the accuracy of guilty verdicts."' 27 For, as the Court also observed, it is "a fundamental value determination of our system
... that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a
guilty man go free."' 28
The goal of minimizing the risk of an erroneous conviction is
advanced by the various rules designed to ensure factfinding
accuracy. Most of these rules apply in an even-handed fashion.
Rules excluding evidence that is unreliable or likely to be given
too much weight by thejury commonly apply to both prosecution
and defense.' 29 Also, both sides can challenge the impartiality of
jurors or judges. 3 ° Other standards relating to factfinding
accuracy, however, are aimed specifically at protecting the
innocent accused. Thus, the prosecution is required to disclose
material exculpatory evidence within its possession or control. "'
Similarly, the defendant's right to a face-to-face confrontation
with opposing witnesses partially rests on the premise that such
a confrontation "reduc[es] the risk that a witness will wrongfully
implicate an innocent person."' 32 Protection of innocence also
underlies special rules that give the defendant-witness greater

protection when testifying than that given to
33
other witnesses.
Protection against erroneous convictions
is also provided by legal standards that accord to the defendant the benefit of doubts as
to his guilt. The most substantial protection
of this type is the requirement that the state
establish guilt by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Supreme Court described the
reasonable doubt standard as the "prime
instrument [in the 'American scheme of
criminal procedure'] for reducing risk of
convictions resting on factual error"' 34 and
characterized its "stringency" as operating
to "impose almost the entire risk of error"
upon the state.' 35 The requirement of a
unanimous jury verdict does not similarly
shift the burden to the state, as it applies to

both acquittals and convictions. It does, however, provide
assurance that the state will have made its case fully when it gains
a conviction.'36
The defendant is given the benefit of the doubt in a less direct
fashion by other legal standards. The double jeopardy bar gives
absolute finality to an acquittal even where it appears to be based
on error. As the Supreme Court noted, "[t]o permit a second trial
after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been,
would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government,
with its vastly superior resources might wear down the defendant
so that 'even though innocent' he may be found guilty."' 37

Further, in determining whether a trial error requires reversing a
conviction, appellate courts traditionally require a new trial
when there is a likelihood that the error affected the jury's
judgment, thus rejecting the position that a conviction should
stand if the jury's finding
of guilt appears to be "correct,"
38
notwithstanding error.1
Like other goals in the criminal justice process, protection of
the accused from erroneous conviction has its limitations. The
prosecution's burden of persuasion is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, not a higher standard that requires absolute certainty in the
mind of the jurors. 39 Moreover, in many jurisdictions the burden
does not apply to some defenses or mitigating factors that do not
directly contradict the elements of the offense. 40 Similarly,
while eyewitness identification poses a recognized risk of mistake, convictions based upon such identifications are acceptable,
subject to limited restraints. 4' While "[r]ecognizing a real, if
slight, danger of false self-condemnation, we allow evidentiary
42
use of confessions, subject to constitutional safeguards."'
Minimizing the Burdens of Accusation and Litigation

[lit is "afundamental
value determination
of our system.., that
it is far worse to
convict an innocent
person than let a
guilty man go free.

Even if eventually acquitted, an innocent person charged with a crime suffers
substantial burdens. The accusation casts
doubt on the person's reputation that is not
easily erased. As Judge Frank once noted:
"In the public mind, the blot on a man's
escutcheon, resulting from such a public
accusation, is seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not guilty. Frequently,
the public remembers the accusation and
still suspects guilt even after an acquittal."' 43
Even if the public should accept an acquittal
as full vindication of the accused, other
burdens borne by a defendant in the course
of gaining that acquittal remain unaddressed.
Unless indigent, defendants must finance
their defense as successful defendants are
not entitled to reimbursement of expenses

"
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upon acquittal. Perhaps more significant,
however, are costs that cannot be readily
measured in dollars. Once accused, a defendant must await trial. This waiting period
brings with it a certain degree of anxiety and
insecurity that disrupts the daily flow of life.
This disruption is even greater if the accused
is incarcerated pending trial. When the trial
actually occurs, the ordeal of litigation takes
a further emotional toll.
In light of these substantial burdens,
criminal justice process concerned with the
protection of the innocent cannot limit itself
to ensuring against erroneous convictions,
It must also reduce, to an acceptable level,
the risk that accusations will be brought

against innocent persons. Because the burdens of an accusation are not as great as the
burdens of erroneous conviction, the accept-
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able degree of risk is somewhat greater. It is
not necessary to limit accusations to cases in
which conviction is almost certain, for the
prosecution would then be deprived of many
otherwise valid convictions. Adequate protection against erroneous accusations does
of/lay
require, however, that accusations be suppl
ported by sufficient evidence to produce a
substantial likelihood of conviction.
In limiting the number of erroneous accusations, the system
does not solve the problem of the accused who is appropriately
charged but later acquitted (and therefore viewed as possibly
innocent). Some defendants inevitably will fall in this category.
No matter how careful the screening, predicting the outcome of
litigation is too uncertain to avoid mistakes. While the system
cannot avoid imposing substantial litigation burdens on properly
accused defendants who are eventually acquitted, it can minimize their burdens if such efforts are consistent with preserving
a practicable system of adjudication. Because the defendants
who fall in this category cannot be identified at the outset, the
system must minimize litigation burdens for all defendants,
including those who will be found guilty.
Minimizing the risk of erroneous accusations is achieved
through various screening procedures. Initially, the police
officer must have probable cause of guilt before taking a person
into custody for the purpose of charging him with a crime."4a
Moreover, the officer's probable cause determination is subject
to exparte screening by a magistrate, either in the issuance of an
arrest warrant or in the subsequent review of a warrantless
arrest. 4 5 In most jurisdictions, felony charges are subject to
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of the obj ectives
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cipation

further review by a magistrate at an
46
In many
adversarial preliminary hearing.
jurisdictions, as an alternative or additional
felony screening procedure, a grand jury
reviews the prosecution's evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to justify the
proposed indictment.' 7
The goal of eliminating unnecessary litigation burdens is reflected in other rights of
the accused. Bail provisions seek to avoid
pretrial incarceration when there is an alternative means of reasonably assuring
defendant's presence at trial.'4 8 The
defendant's right to a speedy trial is designed, in part, to limit the length of pretrial
incarceration (where bail is not available)
and to "minimize the anxiety and concern"
of the accused pending trial. 49 Venue requirements, in part, ensure that the defendant will be tried in a convenient forum. 50
The double jeopardy prohibition, supplemented by joinder requirements, also reduces litigation burdens by restricting the
use of multiple trials for closely related
offenses. '5'

Providing Lay Participation
Another cornerstone of the American
criminaljustice process is the use of lay persons as decisionmakers.
Traditionally, lay participation was provided through the trial
jury, the grand jury, and lay magistrates. Today, the trial jury
stands alone as the only universally available source of lay
participation. While a substantial majority of states continue to
have some lay magistrates in their judiciaries, the bulk of the
52
criminal cases in those states come before lawyer-magistrates. 1
As for the grand jury, only nineteen states continue to require
grand jury participation (through a defense right to prosecution
by indictment) for all felony cases."'
Because dismissals and guilty pleas account for far more
dispositions than do trials, juries are often not used.5 4 Even when
a case proceeds to trial, many defendants elect to have bench
trials."55 The defendant, however, does have a right to ajury trial
5 6
in all jurisdictions on felony and serious misdemeanor charges.
In most states, the prosecution also has an independent right to
insist upon a jury trial.' 57 Because many of the safeguards
provided by lay juror participation are directed towards the
exceptional case, the availability of a jury at the defendant's
election is the critical feature in meeting most of the objectives
of lay participation.' 58
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Lay juror participation in the criminal
justice process is designed to serve several
distinct functions,' 59 all of which reflect a
single underlying value judgment: the administration of the criminal justice process
is too important to be left exclusively in the
60 Unlike
hands of government officials.

The insikster ce upon

respectfir iindividual
d1.igty

judges or prosecutors, lay jurors are independent from the government bureaucracy.
As the Supreme Court noted, the framers of
the Constitution "knew from history and
experience" that it was necessary to provide
a safeguard through the petit jury, "againstJUStic
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge . . . . Fear of unchecked power, so
typical of our State and Federal Govemment in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence."'' The independence of the grandjury provides a similar
check against the misuse of executive authority in charging.' 62
In addition to their independence, lay petit and grand jurors
offer advantages that stem from their lay perspective and their
representation of the community. Their position as community
representatives lends a special sense of legitimacy to the criminal
justice process, making unpopular decisions more readily acceptable to the general public. Lay jurors' community views
"bring to bear local conceptions of justice ...
and adjust the
crude substantive criminal law to the circumstances of individual
cases."' 6 3 Indeed, jurors may refuse to convict (or charge, in the
case of the grand jury) when they conclude that, notwithstanding
a proven violation, enforcement of the letter of the law would
result in a miscarriage of justice.
Vesting decisionmaking authority in lay jurors, "neither legally trained nor routinely engaged in the administration of
criminal justice," arguably strengthens the factfinding capacity
of the process. 64 The jurors' "very inexperience is an asset
because it secures a fresh perception of each trial, avoiding the
' 65
stereotypes said to infect the judicial eye."'

isr eflected

in variolus 'lements
of the criminal

Although use of lay magistrates today is a necessary consequence of resource limitations (allowing accessible local courts
in rural areas with too few lawyers to provide lawyer-magistrates), the lay magistrate originally was justified by reference to
basic values of lay participation.1 66 The lay magistrate was
assumed to be closer to the community views and therefore more
likely to reflect the community's sense of justice. Only the lay
magistrate could provide this perspective in "petty offense"
cases to which a right to jury trial was unavailable. 67 The
movement away from lay magistrates stems from concern that

Spr

the advantages provided by their perspective are diluted by the bureaucratization of
the magistrate's position within the judicial
hierarchy and are offset by the typical
magistrate's lack of familiarity with, or lack
the
of inclination to take seriously,
defendant's basic legal rights.'68
Respecting the Dignity of the Individual
Another foundational process objective
to
is ensure that criminal justice administration is consistent with respect for the indi-

vidual dignity. The concept of human dignity, as used in this context, is far from
precise. It roughly encompasses the basic
needs of the human personality, including
privacy, autonomy, and freedom from humiliation and abuse.'69
Requiring that criminal justice practices respect human dignity is justified on several grounds. First, all persons, including
criminals, are entitled to governmental respect for their dignity
as an inherent element of the social compact which provides the
foundation for a democratic society. 7 Second, in light of the
combination of the "severity of the sanctions administered by the
criminal law," the "status-degrading potency of criminal proceedings," and the "community outrage" that tempts officials to
solve crime at all costs, the preservation of human dignity is the
sine qua non for maintaining a society that respects individual
liberty and adheres to the rule of law.' 7 ' As the Supreme Court
noted:
When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life,
liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps. No
general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole
can well be expected without judicial recognition of the
paramount need for prompt, eminently fair, and sober
criminal law procedures. The methods we employ in the
enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the
measures by which the quality of our civilization may be
judged.'72
Finally, ensuring respect for individual dignity is essential in
obtaining public acceptance of the process and to promote
respect for the law.' 73
The insistence upon respect for individual dignity is reflected
in various elements of the criminal justice process. Many
procedural requirements that implement other cornerstone objectives also serve this goal. Thus, requirements promoting an
adversarial adjudicatory system recognize individual dignity by
giving the defendant an element of control over his own de-
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fense. 714 Similarly, the Supreme Court described the privilege
against self-incrimination as based on "our respect for the
75
inviolability of the human personality.'
Other legal requirements are devoted entirely to ensuring
respect for human dignity. The Eighth Amendment bars cruel
and unusual punishment which reduces individual honor and
dignity. 176 Insofar as the double jeopardy prohibition provides
for the repose of the convicted defendant (rather than safeguarding against erroneous convictions), it also focuses on limiting the
oppression to which the guilty can be subjected.' 77 The Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures guarantees respect for another aspect of human dignity, the
privacy of the individual. It does, however, permit government
officials to invade that privacy upon a demonstration of sufficient need and grounding. 7 1 Many common law standards, such
as the privilege for marital communications, recognize the
essential needs of the human personality. 7 9
Legal restrictions aimed at ensuring respect for individual
dignity tend to be more truth-deflecting than standards serving
other objectives of the criminal justice process. Typically, such
restrictions prevent prosecutors from obtaining probative evidence that could establish guilt. The impact of that loss often is
unclear because the evidence is not obtained. The loss is
crystallized, however, when incriminating evidence otherwise
establishing the defendant's guilt is held inadmissible, and the
prosecution is lost. By disallowing the use of such incriminating
evidence, the criminal justice process uses
the criminal prosecution itself to vindicate
the prohibition that was violated.
The use of prosecutorial presentation as
the appropriate forum for vindication, rather
t

because he is strategically located, and motivated, to call
the attention of the courts to excesses in the administration
of criminal justice. The underlying premise is that of a
social utilitarianism. If the criminal goes free in order to
serve a larger and more important end, then social justice
is done, even if individual justice is not. 80

A positiv

than imposing sanctions directly upon the
governmental agents who violated the restrictions, is accepted in some applications
and highly controversial in others. Perhaps
the most controversial application is the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure provisions. The basic premise underlying this remedy was stated aptly by Abraham
Goldstein:
Justice to society is sometimes taken to
require that a given case be used not only
to deal with the situation immediately
before the court but also to serve a larger
public interest. In criminal cases, the
accused may get relief, not so much out of
concern for him or for the "truth," but

Of

Maintaining the Appearance of Fairness
The criminal justice process seeks not only to provide fair
procedures, but also to maintain the appearance of fairness in
applying its procedures. As the Supreme Court noted, "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice."'' The fact that criminal
justice procedures are fair is not sufficient; the procedures must
also be perceived as fair (and as fairly administered) by both its
participants and the public.
The appearance of fairness is essential to the effectiveness of
process. Initially, it is vital to maintain public confidence in the
process.82 Because three of the primary administrators of the
process, the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel, are
all members of the same profession, there may be a tendency on
the part of outsiders to view the process with some suspicion.
This suspicion can be offset by ensuring that the process and its
decisions are open to public review. 83 These factors also may
help reconcile the losing defendant to his fate. Even though he
may disagree with the result, he knows who made the decision
and how it was reached.'84 Finally, the appearance of fairness,
particularly as it relates to the trial stage, is
necessary to fulfill what commentators have
erception
characterized as the "symbolic function" of
the trial. 8 5 That function is described as
providing a "series of object lessons and
examples" through which "society is trained
in right ways of thought and action, not by
compulsion, but by parables which it interprets and follows voluntarily."'86
A positive perception of the criminal
justice process is sought through legal stan-

en
crfminal

justice prc)cess is
soughttI ro igh legal
stand ard !S that

dards that guarantee the openness of the

guaranthe Ppenness
of the p roc ess and

sible bias. Those designed to ensure the
openness of the process include constitutional and statutory standards that guarantee public access to the trial and pretrial
proceedings.' 87 Openness is also provided
by statutes and common law doctrines allowing public inspection of documents and

preclude su gestions
ofpos, ible bias.

process and preclude suggestions of pos-

records relating to an even broader range of

proceedings.' 88
Legal standards to eliminate suggestions
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of bias include several that provide relief for the mere possibility
of prejudice (rather than proof of actual prejudice). 8 9 One such
standard, for example, requires automatic reversal of a conviction when a judge may have had financial or personal interest in
the outcome of his decision, without inquiry as to whether that
interest actually produced a biased decision.1 9 At times, the
process' interest in ensuring an appearance of fairness will
prevail over the defendant's desire to forego a particular procedural right. Some jurisdictions require the defendant to be
present at trial even though he would prefer to be tried in
absentia.

viding him with precisely the same assistance available to a nonindigent defendant.'94
A wide range of limited laws prohibit improper discrimination. The primary provision barring discrimination is the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 95 Other constitutional guarantees, such as the Sixth Amendment's counsel and
jury requirements, bar certain types of discrimination.' 96 Statutory provisions often extend beyond constitutional guarantees to
reduce the discriminatory impact of the process. 9 ' Thus, statutory provisions reduce the heavier burden of indigent defendants
by both providing them with greater assistance than constitutionally required and restricting reliance upon procedures more
likely to be unavailable to the poor.'
The recent movement to
limit judicial sentencing discretion also reflects an interest in
reducing a type of discrimination (that based upon differences in
the sentencing philosophies of individual judges) that is not
barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. 199

9

'

Achieving Equality in the Application of the Process
In a society dedicated to achieving "equal justice under law,"
it is natural that another goal of the criminal justice process is to
achieve equality in its administration. The primary concern is
that each jurisdiction be evenhanded in its treatment of defendants. Accordingly, while procedures need not be applied in the
same way to all defendants, similarly-situated defendants must
THE VALUE OF
be treated alike. 192 In other words, distinctions drawn between defendants must be
based on grounds that are properly related to
ublic policy
the process' functions.
A proper basis for disparate treatment of
defendants varies with each case. In deterrequired, the
mining whether to press charges, for example, a prosecutor could rationally draw
lint should be
distinctions based on a variety of factors
(such as differences in the defendants' past--enti"yng cornerstone
records) that would have no bearing in determining which defendant will receive sixperson rather than twelve-person juries. As
and assessa result, where a broad range of relevant
factors are likely to produce legitimate conelationship to
siderable disparity from one case to another,
the process tends to provide extensive disthe
cretion to the decisionmaker. When the
procedural step should result in roughly similar treatment for all, the decisionmaker's
ess function
authority to draw distinctions is more nar-

When pJ

analysis is
startingp

principle
ing their r

core proc

rowly proscribed. The range of permissible

considerations is not unlimited, however,
even in those areas where extensive discretion is granted. Certain factors such as race,
ethnicity, and religion are viewed as improper grounds for discrimination throughout the process.'93 Indigency may also fall
within this category, although the state's
obligation to the indigent falls short of pro-

of pr omoting

effective

enforcement

of the substantive
crimiinal law.

CORNERSTONE ANALYSIS

Public policy analysis often must take a
back seat for a court that must decide whether
a particular legal standard is legally mandated. Statutory or constitutional language,
legislative history, or precedent often clearly
provides an answer so as to minimize the
need for such analysis. At times, however,
the court needs to look to the basic policies
that shape the process. For the legislator, the
high court considering the adoption of a
court rule, and the delegate to a state constitutional convention, public policy analysis
will more frequently be critical, as the lawmaker here commonly possesses greater freedom in establishing new standards or rejecting old standards.
Where public policy analysis is required,
the starting point should be identifying cornerstone principles and assessing their relationship to the core process function of promoting effective enforcement of the substantial criminal law. That is the task attempted here. Others may find additional or
somewhat differently defined cornerstone
objectives. They may see differently the
possible relationships between those objectives and achievement of effective enforcement. In any case, the process of identification and articulation should help the lawmaker in providing a basic framework for
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the analysis of the role of a particular legal requirement. While
that may be only the beginning of the lawmaker's task, it is a very

important first step.
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46. See Uviller, supra note 44 at 1076; Arenella, supra note 4.
47. Pulaski, supra note 44 at 22-54 (quoting JEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 15-16 (1949)).
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48.

John D. Jackson, Theories of Truthfinding in Criminal

Procedure:An EvolutionaryApproach, 10 CARDOZA L.

REV.

475

(1988); Pulaski, supra note 44.
49. See Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 456-58; Tom Stacy, The
Search For the Truth in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure,91
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1406-09 (1991).
50. See generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
51. Pearce v. Pearce, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (1846), cited in
West Virginia v. Douglass, 20 W.Va. 770, 783 (1882) (discussing the attorney-client privilege). See also James v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 307, 311 (1990).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI.
54. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Stephen J. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice

Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL

STUDIES

43, 66-

74 (1988); John S. Elson, Balancing Costs in Constitutional
Construction: The BurgerCourt's Expansive New Approach, 17
AM. CRIM.

L.

REV.

160 (1979).

55. See, e.g., United States v. John Doe, Inc. 1, 481 U.S. 102,
117 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
174 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.
648, 655 (1976) (The "fundamental purpose" of self-incrimination privilege is "preservation of an adversarial system of criminal justice."). For an exploration of the distinction between
adversarial and accusatorial adjudication, see Abraham Goldstein,
Reflections on Two Models: InquisitorialThemes in American

Criminal Procedure, 26

STAN.

L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1974); note

105 infra.

56. AUSTRALIA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REFORM, April 1980,
at 52. See also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 10-13
(1980); PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 61 (1979).
57.

See William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent

Counsel -- The Trial Judge's Role, 93

HARV.

L. REV. 633 (1980);

Stephen A. Saltzburg, The UnnecessarilyExpanding Role of the
American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1 (1978); LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 1, §§ 20.3, 20.5, 24.3 and 24.5.
58. See RUDOLF SCHLESSINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 473-91
(5th ed. 1988); Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 421-25; Thomas
Weigand, Continental Casesfor American Ailments: European
Criminal Procedureas a Modelfor Law Reform, in 2 CRIME AND
JUST. 381 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1980).
59. This commonly includes questioning the defendant, who
may give his side of the case in narrative form (not under oath).
See Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 423; Damaska, supra note 11,
at 506, 527 (1973).
60. See Frassler, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An
Adversarial System of Criminal Procedurein Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245-46, 267-72 (1991);

Damaska, supra note 11, at 559-61; Robert Vouin, The Role of
the Prosecutorin FrenchCriminalTrials, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 483
(1970).
61.
See generally ADHEMAN EIsMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

3-18 (J. Simpson transl. 1913).

62. See PENDLETON HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 38183 (1931); Morris Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day
CriminalProceduresin Europe and America, 48 HARV. L. REV.
433, 436 (1935).
63. See Nicholas Kittrie, Symbolic Justice: The Trial of Criminal Cases, in AN ANATOMY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE--A SYSTEM
OVERVIEW 121, 125 (Cleon H. Foust & D. Robert Webster eds.,
1980) ("Much as fierce individualistic economic competition
was to produce better and cheaper goods for all to share in, fierce
adversity in court was to produce the truth."); FRANKEL, supra
note 56, at 10-20; Marian Neef & Stuart Nagel, The Adversary
Nature of the American Legal System From A Historical Perspective, 20 N.Y.L. FORUM 123, 147-48 (1974).
64. See FREEDMAN, supra note 34, at 14-42; STEPHAN LANDSMAN,
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 44-47
(1984). The Supreme Court has cited both of these justifications
in discussing elements of the adversary process. See, e.g.,
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988); United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648 (1984); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758-59
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. The Supreme Court has placed special emphasis upon this
process of adversarial testing of evidence and theory. See
Penson, 488 U.S. at 84 ("[S]ystem is premised on the well-tested
principle that truth -- as well as fairness -- is 'best discovered' by
powerful statements on both sides of the question."); Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857, 862 (1975) ("[T]he very premise
of our adversarial system... is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the
guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.").
66. See Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN
LAW 43-44 (Harold Joseph Berman ed., 1971).
67. Jon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Report of the Joint
Conference on ProfessionalResponsibility, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1160-61 (1958).

68.

See JEROME FRANK,

COURTS ON TRIAL

80-102, 122 (1949);

Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 435-42; Steffen, supra note 43, at
817-23.
69. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("[O]ur legal
tradition regards the adversary process as the best means of
ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of error.").
70. Van Kessel, supra note 14, at 487-501.
71.
Frankel, supra note 43, at 1036.
72. See Steffen, supra note 43, at 820-22; Van Kessel, supra
note 14, at 435-38; Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4
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STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951).
73. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (Prosecution interest "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8.
74. See JOHN JAY DOUGLASS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 720 (1988); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
75. Unlike the prosecutor, the defense counsel's obligation is
not to "do justice," but to advance the interest of the defendant
as a partisan. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
("[U]nder our adversary system, [the defense counsel] deems
that his sole duty is to protect his client -- guilty or innocent -- and
that in such a capacity he owes no duty to help society solve its
crime problem."); Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) ("[U]nder our adversary system
the role of counsel is not to make sure the truth is ascertained, but
to advance his client's cause by any ethical means.").
76. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, Ch. 1-6 (1975); Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or a
CategoricalImperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 343 (1981).
77. See Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look False
and the False Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135 (1988); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Search For Truth Continued, The Privilege
Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67
(1982); Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel'sSearchfor Truth,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975).
78. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 74, at 66-84; Jay Sterling
Silver, Equality of Arms and The Adversarial Process:A New
ConstitutionalRight,1990 Wis. L. REV. 1007; WilliamJ. Genego,
The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781 (1988); Barbara
Allen Babcock, FairPlay: Evidence Favorable to an Accused
and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133
(1982).
79. DEVLIN, supra note 56, at 71 (quoting an English Committee Report on Identification Evidence).
80. FELLMAN, supra note 9, at 4. See also Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Zacharias, supra note
74.
81. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and The Accused:
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J.
1149, 1173-74 (1962).
82. Babcock, supra note 78.
83. Roscoe Pound, The Cannons of Procedural Reform, 12
A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1926). Pound attributed this theory to "the
Anglo-Saxon bent for contentious procedure and love of a fair
fight, and the desire of the pioneer American to see a forensic
game of skill in backwoods court houses." Id.

84. The earlier criticisms, in addition to that of Pound, supra
note 83, are noted in Perkins, Absurditiesin CriminalProcedure,
11 IOWA L. REV. 297, 324-25 (1926). More recent complaints as
to the promotion of a sporting theory are noted in Van Kessel,
supra note 14, at 448-51; Joseph D. Grano, Implementing the
Objectives ofProceduralReform: The ProposedMichigan Rules
of Criminal Procedure- Part L 32 WAYNE L.J. 1007 (1986).
85. Grano, supra note 84, at 10 19-20.
86. See Zacharias, supra note 74, at 54-56 (citing various
commentators who stress alternativejustifications); Goodpaster,
supra note 44.
87. See, e.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

117 (1980); Saltzburg, supra note 44, at

684.
88. THURMOND ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 128-29, 145
(1935). See also PACKER, supra note 10, at 157; Frank J.
Michelman, Formal and AssociationalAims in ProceduralDue

Process, in

DUE PROCESS,

supra note 7, at 126.

89.

Neef & Nagel, supra note 63, at 155. See also GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120-135 (1978).
90. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (discussing the
defendant's right to self-representation).
91. See DEVLIN, supra note 56, at 59; JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 118
(1975) ([A]dversary system was "judged fairest and most trustworthy both by persons subject to litigation and by those observing the proceedings.").
92. Damaska, supra note 11, at 506, 583.
93. See Faretta,422 U.S. at 818 (noting that the Sixth Amendment, through these rights "constitutionalizes the right in an
adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know it");
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 20.1.
94. The use of in camera, ex parte presentations on pretrial
rulings also has been confined. See Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1989).
95. See Michigan v. Jackson 475 U.S. 625 (1986); United
States v. Wade, 368 U.S. 218 (1967); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964); Francis Allen, The JudicialQuestfor Penal
Justice: The Warren Court and Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.
REV.

518, 530.

96. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 8.15.
97. Id. § 14.2. Reliance on other inquisitorial proceedings,
such as the coroner's inquest, has also diminished. See Robert
Emmett Bums, CriminalJustice:Adversary orInquest:Did Due
Process Reform the Wrong System, 2 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 249
(1971).
98. As to preventive detention, see United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739 (1987); As to incompetency, see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
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(1966).
99. See
100. See

LAFAVE

&

ISRAEL,

supra note 1, §§ 26.4(g), 26.5(e).

ALEXANDER B. SMITH & HARRIET POLLACK, CRIMINAL
157 (3d ed. 1991) ("[R]eality of our judicial process
conforms more closely to the bureaucratic model than to the

JUSTICE

adversary ideal.");

ABRAHAM

S.

BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

154-177 (2d ed. 1979); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal
Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent
Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463,466-70,
523-33 (1980) (surveying this line of criticism and the reform
proposals it spawned).
10 1. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, §§ 1.4(f), (1), 21. l(b).

102. Id. § 21.1; Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing PleaBargainingDebate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981).
103. See Mirjan Damaska, Adversary System, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 24, 28-29 (Sanford Kadish ed., 1983);
MALCOME M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT

13-14

(1979); Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 509 (1979).
104. See THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., EXAMINING

LOCAL LEGAL

CULTURE: PRACTITIONER ATTITUDES IN FOUR CRIMINAL COURTS 8

(1982) (adversarial relationship can govern plea negotiation just
as it governs trade union contracts or international treaties);
Goodpaster, supra note 44, at 139-144 (suggesting that the
adversarial trial "may form the foundation of a system of criminal case resolution that is much greater than the trial" where trials
"radiate their effects through the system" and thereby impact
non-trial dispositions).
105. See Goldstein, supra note 55 ("Adversary refers to a
method of resolving disputes and takes its contour from the
contested trial," while "accusatorial" encompasses "other fundamental premises" designed to compliment the adversary trial
procedure in the protection of the accused.)
106. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415
(1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964),
quoting 8

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

317 (McNaughton rev., 1961).

107. Tehan, 382 U.S. 406; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
108. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A concern for reliability is inherent in
our criminal justice system, which relies upon accusatorial ...
practices" and therefore reflects a "distrust for reliance on
confessions."); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (Presumption of innocence provides a safeguard against erroneous
conviction by giving added emphasis to the principle that one
"accused of crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence
determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial
and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued
custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.");

Murphy, 378 U.S. at 52 (Self-incrimination privilege founded in
part on "our realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a
shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent."')
(quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)).
109. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Pulaski, supra note 44, at 12,45
("By far the most common explanation for requiring proof
before punishment... is distrust of political authority.").
110. See supra notes 78-82.
111. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., plurality).
112. Taylor, 436 U.S. at 484 n.12 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2511, at 407 (3d ed. 1940)).
113. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) ("There is always
in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding
.... Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending
value--as a criminal defendant in his liberty--this margin of error
is reduced as to him by the process of placing in the other party
the burden ... of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of
the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
114. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
115. CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LEGAL DUTIES 256 (1931).
116. See Watts 338 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J.) ("Under our
system, society carries the burden of proving its charge against
the accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish its case,
not by interrogation of the accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation.").
117. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, 191-95 (1985)
(noting that defense burden is common for: "self defense and
similar claims of justification for conduct that would otherwise
be criminal; necessity, duress, and claim of right: irresponsibility
by reason of mental disease or defect; license; and many claims
of exemption from a statutory prohibition based on a proviso or
exception in the definition of the crime").
118. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Winship
Redux: 1970 to 1990, 69 TEX. L. REV. 109 (1990).
119. Medina v. California 112 S. Ct. 2572,2577 (1992); LAFAVE
& ISRAEL, supra note 1, §§ 3.2(i), 6.9, 7.2, 8.10(e), 21.2.
120. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); See also Rogers
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
121. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, §§ 3.2(i), 6.9, 7.2,
8.10(e), 21.2. But see Goldstein, supra note 55, at 1020 (describing the "use of the accused for interrogation and search" and the
practice of offering plea-bargain concessions as "inquisitorial
devices" which have coexisted with the "accusatorial tradition"
of American law).
122. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985) ("The

U
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private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that
places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely
compelling. Indeed, the host of safeguards fashioned by this
Court over the years to diminish the risk of erroneous conviction
stands as a testament to that concern.").
123. See Yale Kamisar, Due Processand Criminal Procedure,
in THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 1,at 8 (National College
of District Attorneys 1977) (Defendant's constitutional right to
proceed pro se, as recognized in Faretta,422 U.S. 806, represents that "rare instance where the due process goal of insuring
respect for the dignity of or individuality of the defendant clashes
with and prevails over the first and more obvious due process
objective of minimizing the possibility that an innocent person
may be convicted."). See also text following footnote 53 supra.
124. Numerous Supreme Court opinions have described the
truthfinding function as providing a "two-way street," designed
to gain conviction of the guilty as well as acquittal of the
innocent. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 23031 (1975); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
125. See Stacy, supra note 49, at 1405-09 (Concern here is
"error allocation" rather than "error avoidance," so that protections like the reasonable doubt standard of proof may be regarded
as "truth impairing."); see also Grano, supra note 2, at 1013.
126. Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416
(1966).
127. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971). But
see Stacy, supra note 49 (questioning whether the Court has
actually given a higher priority to this concern.)
128. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 214 (1988) (quoting Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970)).
129. See 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
206 (4th ed. 1992); Damaska, supra note 11, at 514-21.
130. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, §§ 22.3, 22.4.
131. Id. § 20.7.
132. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990).
133. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (state must allow

hypnotically refreshed testimony of defendant); MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 129, §§ 21-26, 41-44 (permissible scope of
cross-examination and impeachment of defendant).
134. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
135. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
136. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 392-93 (1972).
While unanimity is not constitutionally required, it is the standard in the vast majority of states. See Birch v. Louisiana, 441
U.S. 130 (1979).
137. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978).
138. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 27.6.
139. See Anthony A. Marano, A Reexamination of the Develop-

ment of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507 (1975)
(arguing that the seventeenth century persuasion standard of a
"satisfied conscience" probably came closer to a absolute certainty requirement).
140. See supra note 118; see also Scott E. Sundby, The
Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 457 (1989); Scott E. Sundby, The Virtues of a
Procedural View of Innocence--A Response to Professor
Schwartz, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1989).
141. Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proofof Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395 (1987).
142. Grano, supra note 85, at 1013-14.
143. In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (2d Cir. 1947) (Frank, J.,
concurring).
144. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 3.3(a).
145. Id. § 3.5(a).
146. Id. § 14.2.
147. Id. § 15.1.
148. Id. § 12.1. Danger to the community may also be considered in determining whether release pending trial is appropriate.
Id. §§ 12.3, 18.1(b).
149. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
150. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 16.1(c), (g).
151. I§§ 17.4(b), 27.1.
152. See DORIS PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NON-LAWYER
JUDGES AND THE POLICIES OF PROFESSIONALISM 24-60 (1986); LINDA
J. SILBERMAN, NON-ATTORNEY JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 24-35
(1979).
153. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 15.1.
154. See supra note 101.
155. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 1.3(n).
156. Id. § 22.1(a)-(b).
157. Id. § 22.1 (h).
158. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (noting
that, "even where defendants are satisfied with bench trials, the
right to a jury trial very likely serves its intended purpose of
making judicial or prosecutorial unfairness less likely").
159. Professor Freedman cites six such functions--preventing
governmental oppression, countering complaint, biased, or eccentric judges, leveling and democratizing the law, bringing a
fresh perspective to familiar fact patterns, and governing by
direct democracy. Freedman, supra note 34, at 38-39.
160. See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could
the ContinentalAlternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 193, 209 ("[O]f the many purposes attributed
to the jury, one stands out as paramount. The power to condemn
citizens to criminal sanctions is potentially so dangerous that it
ought not be left entirely hirelings of the state .....
161. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
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162. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (1992);
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1969); Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212 (1960).
163. Damaska, supra note 3, at 512. See also supra note 14.
164. Langbein, supra note 160, at 210.
165. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 355 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting HARRY KALVEN & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8 (1966)).

166. See

PROVINE,

supra note 152, at I 1-19; JOHN R.

INFERIOR COURTS, SUPERIOR JUSTICE:

A

WUNDER,

HISTORY OF THE JUSTICE OF

Elizabeth G. Brown,
Frontier Justice: Wayne County, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 126
PEACE IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY (1979);

(1972).
167. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 22.1(b).
168. See Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72 (1974);

DAVID

NEUBAUER, AMERICA'S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

419-22 (4th ed. 1992); PROVINE, supra note 152, at 24-60, 82121.
169. See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values:
TowardA More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978); Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology

and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication - A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
170. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without A Fourth
Amendment, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1991) (stating that the
protection of "individual interests," such as "privacy" and "au-

tonomy" are "clearly shared even by citizens who are 'guilty"');
Donald Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and The Inference of Guilt
From Silence: Griffin v. CaliforniaAfter Fifteen Years, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 841, 850-51 (1980) (noting the grounding of the selfincrimination privilege in "social compact theory of government" out of which "comes an idea that the individual is the
source of his government's sovereignty, and thus that in relations
with that government he should be treated with the respect due
an equal.").
171. Francis A. Allen, The Crisis of Legality in the Criminal
Law? Reflections on the Rule ofLaw, 42 MERCER L. REV. 811,821
(1991).
172. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962)
(citing a lecture by Justice Schaefer, reprinted as Federalismand
State Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)).
173. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
175. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
176. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991); Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
177. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 25. 1(b).
178. Id. § 3.2.
179. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 129, Ch. 9;

Kamisar, supra note 123, at 542-43.
180. Goldstein, supra note 81, at 1149.
181. Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
182. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,59495 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("For a civilization founded
upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and flourish, its
members must share the conviction that they are governed
equitably. That necessity.., mandates a system of justice that
demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens.").
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